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In any non-deterministic environment, unexpected events can indicate true changes in the world (and
require behavioural adaptation) or reﬂect chance occurrence (and must be discounted). Adaptive be-
haviour requires distinguishing these possibilities. We investigated how humans achieve this by in-
tegrating high-level information from instruction and experience. In a series of EEG experiments, in-
structions modulated the perceived informativeness of feedback: Participants performed a novel prob-
abilistic reinforcement learning task, receiving instructions about reliability of feedback or volatility of
the environment. Importantly, our designs de-confound informativeness from surprise, which typically
co-vary. Behavioural results indicate that participants used instructions to adapt their behaviour faster to
changes in the environment when instructions indicated that negative feedback was more informative,
even if it was simultaneously less surprising. This study is the ﬁrst to show that neural markers of
feedback anticipation (stimulus-preceding negativity) and of feedback processing (feedback-related
negativity; FRN) reﬂect informativeness of unexpected feedback. Meanwhile, changes in P3 amplitude
indicated imminent adjustments in behaviour. Collectively, our ﬁndings provide new evidence that high-
level information interacts with experience-driven learning in a ﬂexible manner, enabling human lear-
ners to make informed decisions about whether to persevere or explore new options, a pivotal ability in
our complex environment.
& 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Humans and other animals use their ability to predict which
action will lead to which outcome to choose appropriate actions
and monitor their success. Occurrence of unexpected events can
indicate incorrect or failed actions. However, in non-deterministic
environments, unexpected events can happen for fundamentally
different reasons: They may indicate true changes in the world
and require adaptation, but sometimes they may instead reﬂect
chance occurrence and should be discounted. To behave adap-
tively, an agent therefore needs to determine whether or not un-
expected events indicate that a change in the environment has
occurred. In other words, the agent must assess and integrate the
event's informative value. Within this framework, the informative
value of an unexpected event would be high, for example, if vo-
latility in the environment was known to be high: unexpectedInc. This is an open access article
ental Psychology, University
.-M. Schiffer).events in volatile environments are more likely to reﬂect mean-
ingful changes than unexpected events in stable environments.
Thus, informative value is a parameter informed by a model of the
world, which is at least partly dissociable from the unexpected-
ness of experienced events.
Learning from unexpected events, or prediction errors, is the
focus of reinforcement-learning (RL) theories of adaptive beha-
viour. A core tenet of a major class of RL theories is that successful
interaction with our environment depends critically on reducing
the unexpectedness of events we encounter (Schultz et al., 1997;
Sutton and Barto, 1990). Linking volatile environments to RL,
previous work has shown that humans can use an experience-
based estimate of volatility to adjust the rate at which they learn
from unexpected feedback (Behrens et al., 2007). However, human
learning does not rely solely on learning from direct experience: A
fundamental human ability is to learn rapidly from explicit in-
struction, as instructions can provide a model of the world that
helps to interpret events. Yet little is known about how instruction
interacts with experience to shape behaviour (Cole et al., 2013).
The present experiments investigated the effect on trial-and-under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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formative value of unexpected outcomes. We tested how a change
in informativeness modulates adaptive behaviour and the neural
correlates of feedback processing. Speciﬁcally, we investigated the
impact of instructions about the environment (in terms of its vo-
latility) or about feedback (in terms of its reliability) in a prob-
abilistic reversal-learning task that required participants to in-
tegrate feedback to learn rules and adjust to rule changes.
In classical paradigms that focus on experience-based learning,
informative value is so highly correlated with expectation and
surprise that the two are often treated as isomorphic. Crucially,
however, in the present experiments we dissociated effects of in-
formative value from those of experience-based surprise: In-
struction that response-outcome contingencies are volatile (i.e.,
likely to change) makes unexpected negative feedback more in-
formative but at the same time less surprising, because learners
should anticipate the occurrence of negative feedback indicating
the need to adapt behaviour. Conversely, instruction that feedback
is reliable (i.e., consistently indicative of choice accuracy) likewise
makes feedback more informative, but makes unexpected negative
feedback more surprising: If feedback is reliable, responses are
more likely to yield expected (positive) feedback than unexpected
(negative) feedback.
We tested the impact of instructions about environmental vo-
latility and feedback reliability on adaptive behaviour and EEG
correlates of feedback integration. We hypothesised that adapta-
tion would be fast under volatility and reliability instructions,
which should be evident in enhanced learning of correct responses
following changes in the environment. In our EEG measures, we
focused in particular on the feedback-related negativity (FRN)
component as a marker of feedback processing, the stimulus
preceding negativity (SPN) as a correlate of the anticipation of
feedback, and the P3 as an index of feedback evaluation for im-
mediate updating of action plans.
The FRN is observed as a rapid neural response (200–300 ms)
following feedback presentation (Miltner et al., 1997; Gehring and
Willoughby, 2002). A wealth of evidence has identiﬁed the FRN as
a reward prediction error (RPE) signal of the kind proposed by RL
theories (Holroyd and Coles, 2002): The FRN is typically observed
following negative outcomes, with enhanced amplitude when
negative outcomes are rare, or large in magnitude (Sambrook &
Goslin, 2015; Walsh and Anderson, 2012). Our core hypothesis was
that explicit instruction should change perceived informativeness
of feedback, with consequent impact on feedback processing as
reﬂected in the FRN. We expected the FRN to be increased when
informativeness was high (under instructions suggesting volatility
of the environment or highly reliable feedback), compared to
conditions with lower informative value (under instructions sug-
gesting stability of the environment or unreliable feedback). This
hypothesis stands in contrast to existing characterisation of the
FRN as reﬂecting the operation of a simple model-free RL system
that learns purely from bottom-up experience (Holroyd and Coles,
2002; Walsh and Anderson, 2012), an interpretation supported by
evidence that the component is strikingly insensitive to valid in-
struction about response-outcome associations (Walsh and An-
derson, 2011). Such an RL account would predict that an increase
in FRN amplitude following unexpected events would be un-
affected by instructions that modulate informativeness.
The account of adaptive behaviour we adopt assumes that
learning relies on explicit, structured internal models of the en-
vironment (Botvinick and Weinstein, 2014) and that the in-
formative value of feedback, derived from this model, is integrated
into learning and modulates neural correlates of feedback-pro-
cessing. This framework suggests that processing of the environ-
ment is not a reactive process, but is instead actively guided by
higher-order expectations. This conclusion would be consistentwith recent ﬁndings and computational simulations indicating
that estimates of uncertainty and volatility have partly in-
dependent effects on learning from feedback (Behrens et al., 2007;
O’Reilly, 2013; Yu and Dayan, 2003; Mestres-Misse et al., 2016),
and correspondingly have dissociable effects on the FRN (Bland
and Schaefer, 2011). The latter ﬁnding is also consistent with an
account of the FRN suggesting that it reﬂects an index of the de-
mand of cognitive control; the demand for cognitive control is
higher when information accumulates indicating the need for
behavioural adaptation (Cavanagh and Frank, 2014).
We hypothesised that top-down modulation of the learning
process would become further apparent in dynamic sampling of
information according to its anticipated informative value. We
therefore measured the SPN, a slow-wave potential observed prior
to the presentation of feedback that provides useful information
on task performance (Brunia, 1988; Morís et al., 2013). We ex-
pected a larger SPN amplitude under instructions suggesting high
compared to low feedback informativeness.
The third EEG component of interest was the P3, which occurs
after feedback presentation and is associated with the evaluation
of feedback (Polich, 2007) and immediate behavioural responses
(Chase et al., 2011). We expected to replicate Chase et al.'s (2011)
ﬁnding that P3 amplitude is predictive of participants’ behaviour
on the following trial, being enhanced prior to behavioural
switches, and thus signifying the decision to adapt to the en-
vironment. In contrast to the FRN, which is associated with the
integration of information in learning and was hence expected to
scale with informative value, we expected the P3 to be more clo-
sely tied to the subsequent action and to reﬂect behaviour on the
next trial independent of instructions.2. Methods
2.1. Participants
Thirty-three participants took part in Experiment 1, 16 in Ex-
periment 1a (7 female) and 17 in Experiment 1b (11 female).
Average age in both parts of Experiment 1 was 21.5 years (18-30).
Data from 5 participants were excluded from the ﬁnal analysis,
4 because of excessive noise in the recordings, 1 because the
participants failed to reach an accuracy level within 2-standard
deviations of the population's mean performance.
Seventeen participants took part in Experiment 2 (7 female),
with an average age of 22.0 years. 2 datasets had to be removed,
one because of excessive noise, and one because the participant
failed to reach an accuracy level within 2-standard deviations of
the population's mean performance. All participants were right
handed, had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, reported no
history of neurological or psychiatric illness and gave written in-
formed consent. They received monetary compensation for parti-
cipation (d10/hour), but no performance-related bonus. The local
ethics committee approved all procedures.
2.2. Stimuli and task
Both experiments used the same novel task, an instructed
probabilistic reversal-learning paradigm. This task required parti-
cipants to learn a new stimulus-response mapping in each block
and to adapt this mapping if an unannounced rule reversal oc-
curred. Participants were instructed to pay attention to the feed-
back to learn which of two possible stimulus-response mappings
was correct. They were instructed that feedback was probabilistic
and that a single rule reversal per block was possible. They were
encouraged to keep paying attention to the trial-by-trial feedback
throughout the block to detect any rule change that occurred. Prior
A.-M. Schiffer et al. / NeuroImage 146 (2017) 626–641628to the main experiment, participants completed two practice
blocks of the task outside the EEG booth and were allowed to ask
questions. The experiments were run with the Psychophysics
Toolbox version 3 (Brainard, 1997) in Matlab 2009b (The Math-
works, Inc., 2009) on a Windows PC attached to a 20 in. monitor at
a resolution of 1024768 and a refresh rate of 75 Hz. We mea-
sured response accuracy and reaction times during the main ex-
periment for further behavioural analyses.
2.3. Experiment 1
Each block started with a written instruction displayed on the
screen. In Experiment 1, participants were instructed about the
volatility of the environment (Fig. 1). Participants received the
instruction: “The rules in this block will probably change” (volati-
lity instruction) in half of the blocks, and the instruction “The rules
in this block will probably remain stable” (stability instruction) in
the other half. Rule reversals occurred in 2/3 of the volatility-in-
struction blocks and 1/3 of the stability-instruction blocks, with
these probabilities made explicit to the subjects. The use of
probabilistic instructions ensured that participants had to pay at-
tention to the feedback and be engaged with the task regardless
which instruction they had received. It also allowed us to measure
the behavioural effects of instructions on adaptation. Because
there was at most one rule reversal per block, we were able to
measure the effects of instructions over a large number of trials,
i.e., all trials that preceded the rule reversal. For all blocks in the
experiment, pre-rule reversal trials differ in no parameter other
than instruction. In each trial, participants had to press one of two
keys (‘f’ and ‘h’ on a standard keyboard) with their left or right
index ﬁnger in response to the image of a familiar object on the
screen (Fig. 1, for a detailed description). The images were scaled
so that they did not exceed 150 pixels in either width or height.
There were two objects in each block, and new objects appeared in
each block. A left-hand keypress was the initially correct response
for one of the objects, and a right-hand keypress was the correct
response for the other. Participants could only determine this in-
itial mapping using feedback in a trial-and-error approach. Feed-
back contingencies were probabilistic, speciﬁcally being con-
tingent on the correctness of the response in 75% of all trials: If
participants implemented the correct mapping, they received
positive feedback (a green smiley) in 75% of the trials and negative
feedback (a red sad face) in 25% of the trials. For incorrect re-
sponses, participants received negative feedback in 75% of the
trials and positive feedback in 25% of the trials. Failures to respond
within a time limit of 2000 ms from stimulus onset were followed
by a white, crossed-out face. Participants were told about the
probabilistic feedback and knew that they had to integrate feed-
back over a number of trials to learn the correct mapping and to
detect rule reversals.
Block lengths varied randomly between 25, 33, and 41 trials,
and rule reversals occurred half-way through the respective
blocks, i.e., on trial 13, 17, or 21. Block-length was counterbalanced
across conditions. The symmetric setup within blocks has two
advantages: First, it minimised participants’ ability to build an
expectation about when rule reversal would occur, which other-
wise could have helped them to decide whether an unexpected
negative feedback was more likely to be caused by a rule reversal
(Fig. 2). Second, having as many trials before and after the rule
reversal increased participants’ motivation to adapt to rule chan-
ges, and also allowed us to run statistical analysis on conditions
with an equal number of trials. Performance in the pre-rule re-
versal phase of volatility-instructed blocks was compared with the
same number of trials from the ﬁrst half of stability-instructed
blocks. Thus, trial numbers and trial-position in the block were
kept constant across comparisons. The same approach was takento post-rule reversal analyses of accuracy: This analysis compared
performance in trials from the second halves of the rule reversal
blocks to trials from the second halves of non-reversal blocks,
again achieving equal trial-numbers and comparable trial-his-
tories thanks to the balanced setup of block lengths across con-
ditions. Participants received feedback on percent correct re-
sponses after each block during a short, self-paced pause. Ex-
periments 1a and 1b differed critically in the interval separating
the response on a given trial and subsequent feedback. In Ex-
periment 1a this interval was 500 ms. In Experiment 1b, we
lengthened this interval to 1200 ms to enable us to measure slow
preparatory potentials preceding feedback delivery. Experiment 1a
had 36 blocks and experiment 1b, owing to the longer response-
feedback interval in each trial, had 27 blocks (Fig. 1).
2.3.1. Behavioural analysis
Behavioural analysis focused on two aspects of behaviour: We
ﬁrst wanted to establish that, prior to a potential rule reversal,
participants learned equally well under the two instruction con-
ditions (initial acquisition). To assess this we calculated partici-
pants’ average accuracy in the ﬁrst half of each block, and also the
average number of trials from the start of each block before par-
ticipants ﬁrst repeated the correct rule on two successive trials (a
key indication that they had established this rule, and were now in
a mode of deliberate exploitation as opposed to explorative, or
guessing behaviour). Correct responding was deﬁned as applying
the currently correct rule, not as receiving positive feedback
(which occurred probabilistically). The second focus of the beha-
vioural analysis targeted the impact of instructions on adaptation
after rule reversals. Here, we used the same two performance
measures as in the ﬁrst analysis, but focused on the second half of
the blocks in which a rule reversal occurred to assess the inﬂuence
of instructions. For this post-reversal phase, we expected partici-
pants to show reduced accuracy in stability-instructed blocks. We
additionally calculated the probability with which participants
would reverse their response mapping following surprising feed-
back as a further indication of adaptive modulation of behaviour
by instructions.
2.3.2. Task design – expectation of negative feedback
A key feature of our design is that it controls for the relative
frequency of negative and positive feedback and thereby the ef-
fects of low-level unexpectedness. At the same time, it in-
dependently manipulates the surprise associated with negative
feedback and its informativeness in a given instruction condition.
If performance prior to rule reversals is comparable between the
conditions (volatility-instructed and stability-instructed blocks)—
as will later be shown to be the case—the two conditions will have
the same frequency of negative feedback in the trials that enter the
EEG analysis. Therefore, simple frequency effects could not explain
any differences observed in the EEG correlates of feedback pro-
cessing. Meanwhile, different levels of accuracy between condi-
tions over the entire block length, i.e., including the second halves
of the blocks (which are not entered into the EEG analysis) would
be expected to modulate participants’ expectations of negative or
positive feedback associated with an instruction. Speciﬁcally, this
higher-level expectation should make negative feedback less sur-
prising in volatility-instructed blocks compared to stability-in-
structed blocks. To foreshadow this important feature of our ex-
periment, we found that the probability of receiving negative
feedback was indeed signiﬁcantly higher in volatility-instructed
than in stability-instructed blocks (t(27)¼5.22, po0.01, two-
tailed), owing to an increase of incorrect responses following rule
reversals. Unexpectedness of negative feedback was therefore
lower under volatility instructions than stability instructions for a
learner who took instructions into account. In sum, negative
Fig. 1. Paradigm setup. A: in Experiment 1, half of the blocks were instructed to be volatile, and the other half of the blocks were instructed to be stable. Following volatility
instructions, the task rules reversed in 2/3 of the blocks. Following stability-instructions, rules only reversed in 1/3 of the blocks. Rule reversals occurred half way through the
blocks, which varied in length to make the timing of rule reversals unpredictable. In Experiment 2, two different instructions, one indicating reliable feedback, the other one
indicating unreliable feedback were paired with three degrees of reliability. The outer two conditions create a plausible context for the conditions of instruction-effect
comparison. The latter conditions were critical, with a ﬁxed, intermediate level of objective feedback reliability (75%) but with varying instruction about feedback reliability.
B: in both experiments, participants had to respond to two different images per block, one of which required a left-hand response and the other one a right-hand response.
Participants had to learn this mapping from the probabilistic, trial-wise feedback. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure, the reader is referred to the
web version of this article.)
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formative but was also on average less surprising than negative
feedback under stability instructions, thus de-confounding in-
formativeness and surprise measures, which typically co-vary.2.4. Experiment 2
In this experiment, we tested whether effects of perceived in-
formativeness on feedback processing would generalise to
A.-M. Schiffer et al. / NeuroImage 146 (2017) 626–641630instructions that do not inform on volatility of the mapping but
that directly concern the feedback itself. Here, the pre-block in-
struction concerned the reliability of feedback. Higher (instructed)
reliability made feedback more informative than lower (in-
structed) reliability. In half of the blocks, participants were in-
structed: “The feedback in this block will be reliable” (reliability
instruction). In the other half, participants were instructed: “The
feedback in this block will be unreliable” (unreliability instruction).
These two types of instructions preceded blocks with three
different degrees of reliability. One quarter of all blocks had highly
reliable feedback (87.5% contingent on correctness of the re-
sponse). These blocks were always preceded by the reliability in-
struction. A second quarter of all blocks had considerably less re-
liable feedback (62.5% contingent on correctness of the response).
These blocks were always preceded by the unreliability instruc-
tion. The remaining blocks were of intermediate feedback relia-
bility, which was the same as implemented in Experiment 1 (75%
contingent on correctness of the response). Half of these blocks
with intermediate reliability (1/4 of all blocks) were preceded by
the reliability instruction, whilst the other half was preceded by
the unreliability instruction (Fig. 1). These latter two block types
(ﬁxed intermediate level of reliability, two types of instructions)
are the crucial blocks for analysis, which allowed us to test for
instruction effects comparable to Experiment 1.
The task was the same probabilistic reversal-learning task as inFig. 2. Learning rates. Pattern of behavioural accuracy in experiment 1 (A) and experim
each block (left panels), or the switch trial (right panels), respectively. A: Participants lear
evident from virtually identical accuracy in the three bins covering the ﬁrst 12 trials. Ho
evident in lower accuracy for the ﬁrst few trials following the switch under stability com
better under reliability (red) compared to unreliability instructions (cyan). Likewise, ad
error bars display standard-error of the mean. (For interpretation of the references to coExperiment 1. A single reversal occurred in 3/4 of the blocks (each
reliability condition appeared 8 times over the entire experiment,
creating an equal number of reversals per reliability condition).
Block lengths were set to 33 trials and the single rule reversal
occurred equally often on trial 9, 17, or 25. This design choice
differed slightly from the setup in Experiment 1 but preserved the
core characteristics: First, setting the average rule reversal trial to
the middle of the block (trial 17), and at least 9 trials before the
end of the block again ensured that participants had the motiva-
tion and opportunity to adapt to the new rule. Second, as the re-
liability levels can be realized as proportions of 8 trials (highly
reliable: 7/8 trials contingent, intermediate reliable: 6/8 con-
tingent, highly unreliable: 5/8 contingent), locating the switch
after multiples of 8 trials allowed us to keep the reliability in the
run-up to the rule reversal and post rule reversal evenly dis-
tributed. Lastly, not exceeding 33 trials in length (which is the
average trial-length in Experiment 1)—even after late rule re-
versals—increased design efﬁciency, as the EEG analyses again
focused on the pre-rule reversal phase of each block. Participants
were again explicitly informed about the rule reversal probability.
Importantly, however, they did not know that more than two
degrees of reliability existed. They received feedback on the per-
centage of correct responses in each block during a short, self-
paced pause after each of the 32 blocks.
In summary, the difference in informativeness by instruction inent 2 (B). Percent correct responses are shown for bins of 4 trials from the start of
ned as fast under volatility instruction (pink) as under stability instruction (blue), as
wever, there was a clear effect of volatility instruction on adaptation behaviour, as
pared to volatility instructions. B: Participants learned faster and performed slightly
aptation was faster following reliability compared to unreliability instructions. All
lour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
A.-M. Schiffer et al. / NeuroImage 146 (2017) 626–641 631this experiment again relates to the probability that an unexpected
negative event was indicative of a change in the rules. Over all
blocks of the experiment (including the truly more reliable and
truly more unreliable feedback blocks), this probability was higher
following reliability instructions than unreliability instructions.
2.4.1. Behavioural analysis
Analysis focused on the conditions that varied in instructed
reliability but in fact had the same feedback contingency. Our
analyses implemented the same tests as the analysis of Experi-
ment 1. The relevant markers of behaviour were percent correct
responses in the part of the block preceding a rule reversal and
trials-to-repetition of the initially correct mapping as measures of
initial acquisition and performance (which were both expected to
be unaffected by instructions, as in Experiment 1). Further, we
again measured percent correct performance and trials-to-re-
petition after rule reversals to assess the effects of instructions on
adaptation (which were expected to differ by instruction). We
used probability of reversing the mapping following surprising
feedback as an additional measure of instruction effects on adap-
tive behaviour.
2.4.2. Task design – expectation of negative feedback
As will be shown later, participants’ performance (and there-
fore number of negative feedback events) prior to rule reversals
did not differ reliably between blocks of equal feedback reliability
but different instructions. However, overall, participants received
more negative feedback in blocks that were instructed to be un-
reliable, as these include blocks in which feedback was indeed
unreliable, which has negative effects on performance. To sum-
marise, in contrast to Experiment 1, participants should be more
surprised by negative feedback in the same condition under which
feedback was considered to be more informative, i.e., in the blocks
that were instructed to be reliable.
2.5. EEG recordings
Participants sat in an electrically shielded, sound attenuating
booth to minimise artefacts in the EEG recordings. A Neuroscan
Synamps2 system (10 GΩ input impedance; 29.8 nV resolution;
Neuroscan, El Paso, TX, USA) was used to record EEG data from
32 Ag/AgCl electrodes mounted in an elastic cap at locations FP1,
FPZ, FP2, F7, F3, FZ, F4, F8, FT7, FC3, FCZ, FC4, FT8, T7, C3, CZ, C4, T8,
TP7, CP3, CPZ, CP4, TP8, P7, P3, PZ, P4, P8, POZ, O1, OZ, and O2. Six
additional external electrodes were attached to the outer canthi of
the left and right eyes, above and below the right eye to measure
electro-oculograms (EOGs), and to the left and right mastoids.
Electrode recordings were referenced to the right mastoid. All
electrode impedances were kept below 50 kΩ. EEG data were
recorded at a sampling rate of 1000 Hz. Online high-pass ﬁltering
was implemented for experiment 1a and 2 at 0.1 Hz. Online high-
pass ﬁltering was avoided for experiment 1b to allow us to mea-
sure slow-wave EEG activity preceding feedback delivery.
2.6. EEG data analysis
In both experiments, the core question addressed was whether
instructions that changed participants' belief about the informa-
tiveness of speciﬁc feedback would modulate feedback processing.
Our analysis focused primarily on the amplitude of the FRN, a
negative-going EEG waveform following feedback onset that is
typically associated with the prediction-error learning signal
(Sambrook and Goslin, 2014; Hauser et al., 2014; Holroyd and
Coles, 2002). We hypothesised that informativeness would impact
not only processing of presented feedback, but also anticipation of
feedback, a signature of a learning process that involves dynamicsampling of information. We therefore assessed whether the am-
plitude of the stimulus-preceding negativity (SPN) prior to feed-
back onset in Experiment 1b would be increased under reliability
instructions. Because the SPN is associated with the anticipation of
informative feedback (Kotani et al., 2003), we considered an in-
crease in amplitude as a marker of preparation for information
sampling. As a marker of later cognitive evaluation of feedback and
strategic modulation (Chase et al., 2011; see Polich, 2007, for re-
view), we measured the P3 component that occurs a few hundred
milliseconds after feedback delivery. Finally, to assess whether any
observed modulations of the FRN, SPN and P3 might be driven by
low-level changes in visual attention to feedback, we analysed N1
and P1 potentials evoked by feedback onset. Both components are
strongly associated with directed attention towards an external
stimulus, be it in the auditory (Näätänen and Picton, 1987) or vi-
sual domain (Luck et al., 2000; Eimer, 2014). Increased P1 and N1
amplitudes are taken to reﬂect increased attention towards the
stimulus, such as may be expected, for example, as a correlate of
increased task engagement.
Eye-blink correction was conducted using an independent
components analysis approach via the EEGLab toolbox for Matlab
(Delorme and Makeig, 2004) in Experiment 1a, and using a re-
gression approach (Semlitsch et al., 1986), implemented in Scan
4.5 (Neuroscan, El Paso, TX, USA) in Experiments 1b and 2. After
epoching the data (details below), trials with voltage differences
4100 mV were discarded. All analyses were performed on data
down-sampled to 250 Hz. Ofﬂine ﬁltering was achieved with a
Hamming-window synchronised ﬁnite impulse response function,
as implemented in EEGLab (Widmann and Schröger, 2012). For the
FRN analysis, P3 analysis, and analysis of N1 potentials in Experi-
ments 1 and 2, data epochs were extracted from 500 ms prior to
feedback onset to 1500 ms post feedback onset. EEG data were
ofﬂine high-pass ﬁltered at 0.1 Hz and low-pass ﬁltered at 24 Hz.
We baseline corrected each epoch to a time window from
200 ms pre feedback onset to 100 ms pre feedback onset in
both experiments.
2.6.1. Experiment 1
2.6.1.1. FRN analysis. The FRN was estimated using an average-
base to peak measure (Yeung and Sanfey, 2004; Chase et al., 2011).
We averaged voltage measures over a fronto-central cluster com-
prising the electrodes: F3, FZ, F4, FC3, FCZ, FC4, C3, CZ, C4 (voltage
topographies in Fig. 4) and calculated the lowest voltage in a time
window from 240 ms to 280 ms post feedback onset, and the
highest voltage in the preceding and following positive-going
components (time windows: 160 ms to 220 ms post feedback
onset and 300 ms to 420 ms post feedback onset, respectively).
The most negative value was then subtracted from the mean of the
two positive peaks to give FRN amplitude. If the highest point was
on the edge of a peak window, the window was gradually widened
until the highest point no longer fell on the edge (Chase et al.,
2011). Results with parallel analyses using quantiﬁcation of the
FRN as simple base-to-peak amplitude did not differ materially
from those reported below.
FRN analysis in both experiments included only trials in which
participants applied the currently correct rule, preceding the rule
reversal. In Experiment 1, this included the trials from the ﬁrst half
of all blocks during which a rule reversal occurred and the trials
from the ﬁrst half of all the length-matched blocks that contained
no rule reversal. Importantly, these trials differed only with regard
to the instruction, but were otherwise identical. We thus ensured
that equal numbers of pre-switch trials in volatility and stability-
instructed blocks entered the analysis. Error trials were excluded
from the analysis, as participants’ feedback expectations are un-
clear in these trials. The FRN analysis therefore contained 4 cate-
gories of feedback: positive vs. negative feedback after correct
-2239 -2245
Fig. 3. HHM. A: modelled parameters. Participants gave a response on every trial (1), either implementing mapping 1 or mapping 2, according to which one they believed
reﬂected the correct mapping at that time. In this example, the required mapping (i.e. the state of the world) switches after 19 trials; the participant needs 6 trials to adjust to
this switch. Each response was paired with feedback in the form of positive (green) and negative (red) smileys (2). The information of the feedback becomes integrated with
the prior of the implemented mapping being correct (initially at 0.5), and the information (surprise) associated with this outcome is captured in I. Unexpected negative
feedback leads to an increase in the Surprise parameter I; during a series of negative feedback outcomes towards the implemented mapping, this value decreases as the prior
probability of the correctness of the implemented mapping decreases, too. Entropy (H) reﬂects the uncertainty that results from an accumulation of informative outcomes,
and thus the uncertainty at the beginning of the respective next trial (3). B: the HMM switches the mapping when an individually ﬁtted entropy-aversion parameter (alpha)
is crossed. An instruction-blind model (model 1), assuming the same entropy-aversion score for all types of blocks (displayed in c), leads to slightly lower percent correctly
predicted trials at the level of the individual, than an instruction-sensitive model (model 2). C: the individually ﬁtted alpha values explain why participants switch faster in
blocks with volatility instruction (patterned bars) – participants displayed signiﬁcantly greater entropy aversion under volatility compared to stability instructions; The BIC
model comparison yields a difference of approx. 6 suggesting a positive advantage of the instruction-sensitive over the instruction-blind model (Kass & Raftery, 1995). (For
interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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feedback after correct responses under volatility instruction.
Average single-subject FRN amplitudes were entered into a re-
peated-measures ANOVA with the factors INSTRUCTION (stability/
volatility) and VALENCE (positive/negative). In a second step, we
included EXPERIMENT VERSION (a or b) as a between-subject
factor in a 222 repeated-measures ANOVA to rule out that
duration of the response-feedback interval had any inﬂuence on
the established FRN effect.
2.6.1.2. SPN analysis. To test whether the amount of expected in-
formative value of the feedback (Brunia, 1988, Kotani et al., 2003;
Morís et al., 2013) would lead to an active preparation for more
relevant events, we measured the stimulus preceding negativity
(SPN) between participants’ responses and feedback onset. The
response-feedback interval in Experiment 1b was increased to
1200 ms to make measuring this slow-wave potential possible.
The EEG data were epoched to response onset, with epochs
beginning 500 ms prior to response onset and ending 500 ms
post feedback onset. The EEG data were high-pass ﬁltered at
0.05 Hz and low-pass ﬁltered at 24 Hz. The soft high-pass ﬁlter
leaves the type of slow-wave potential that we were interested in
intact while preventing artefacts from slower voltage drifts. We
baseline corrected epoched data to a time window from 200 ms
after response onset to 300 ms after response onset. This analysis
followed the measures taken in a recent publication which shows
that the SPN tracks the value of feedback over the course of
learning (Morís et al., 2013): SPN amplitude was measured as the
mean amplitude in three different pre-feedback time windows 1:
600 ms to 400 ms, 2: 400 ms to 200 ms, and 3: 200 msto feedback onset. Data were extracted from an electrode cluster
spanning: FC3, FCZ, FC4, C3, CZ, C4, CP3, CPZ, and CP4. Because the
SPN is typically larger over the right than the left hemisphere, and
amplitude increases gradually, we implemented a 233 re-
peated-measures ANOVA, with the factors INSTRUCTION (volati-
lity/stability), TIME (window: 1/2/3) and LATERALITY (left/central/
right).
2.6.1.3. P3 analysis. Two main questions motivated the P3 ana-
lyses: First, we wanted to establish whether the P3 would show a
comparable instruction effect to the FRN. We therefore mirrored
the FRN analysis for the P3. Single-subject P3 amplitudes were
measured as the maximum voltage in condition-averaged EEG
waveforms within a time window 300 ms to 420 ms post feedback
onset (same as the second peak in the FRN measure), across a
centro-parietal electrode cluster containing the electrodes: CP3,
CPZ, CP4, P3, PZ, P4, and POZ (cf. posterior cluster in Chase et al.
(2011), voltage topography maps in Fig. 5). Average single-subject
P3 amplitudes were entered into the repeated-measures ANOVA
with the factors INSTRUCTION (stability/volatility) and VALENCE
(positive/negative).
Second, we aimed to replicate evidence for a close link between
the P3 and behavioural decisions as described by Chase et al.
(2011), who showed that P3 amplitude predicts reversal behaviour
on a trial-by-trial basis. We therefore measured P3 amplitude as
described above in trials with negative feedback outcomes within
the ﬁrst half of all blocks and tested in a repeated-measures AN-
OVAwith the factors NEXT TRIAL BEHAVIOUR (repeat/reverse) and
INSTRUCTION (stability/volatility) whether P3 amplitude would be
signiﬁcantly larger preceding trials in which participants reversed
Fig. 4. Modulation of ERPs by Volatility Instruction. A: time–voltage plots showing the FRN component following positive (dashed lines) and negative (solid lines) un-
expected feedback under volatility (left panel) and stability (right panel) instructions. The bar graphs (middle panel) plot the average over individual amplitudes, showing
the signiﬁcant effect of instruction on amplitude (1), and the signiﬁcant difference between FRN amplitude following unexpected negative events in the comparison of
volatility-instructed and stability-instructed blocks (2). Voltage topographies show the difference between positive and (unexpected) negative feedback under the respective
instruction conditions in the time interval between 200 ms and 310 ms post stimulus onset. B: The time–voltage plots for the SPN show that this negative pre-feedback
component reached a higher amplitude (lower voltage) preceding feedback under volatility compared to stability instructions. W1-3 refers to the time-windows for analysis.
Voltage topographies show the difference in raw voltage between volatility and stability instruction conditions in the last time window. Dark electrodes delineate clusters
that entered the respective statistical analysis and correspond to the electrodes averaged in time–voltage plots. All error bars display standard-error of the mean.
A.-M. Schiffer et al. / NeuroImage 146 (2017) 626–641 633their behaviour, compared to repetition trials.
2.6.1.4. Visual potentials: P1 & N1. We analysed the P1 and N1
potentials to assess whether any between-condition differences in
EEG activity might reﬂect differences in low-level attention to the
feedback, which could hint, for example, at decreased task-en-
gagement in a given condition. We estimated the P1 amplitude as
the maximum amplitude across a parietal cluster of electrodes in
the standard time window of 60 ms to 100 ms post feedbackonset. The cluster of electrodes was chosen in a data-driven
fashion by assessing the electrodes that reached the highest mean
amplitude in the 4 conditions. This yielded a parietal cluster
comprising P7, P3, PZ, P4, P8, POZ, O1, OZ, and O2. We also esti-
mated the parietal N1 potential as the minimum voltage across the
same electrodes as the P1 in a time window from 140 to 200 ms
after feedback onset. Amplitudes of the P1 and N1 potentials were
then entered into separate repeated-measures ANOVAs with the
factors INSTRUCTION (volatility/stability) and VALENCE (positive/
Fig. 5. Reversal effects on P3 amplitude. A: Effects of behaviour on the next trial on P3 amplitude under volatility (left panel) and stability (right panel) instructions. The P3
amplitude was enhanced preceding reversals of the current mapping (dark lines), compared to repetitions of the ongoing mapping under both instruction conditions. B:
Effects of behaviour on the next trial on P3 amplitude under reliability (left panel) and unreliability (right panel) instructions. There is a positive difference between trials
preceding reversals compared to repetitions under the reliability instructions. A and B: Voltage topographies show the difference between trials preceding reversals and
repetitions under the respective instruction conditions, dark electrodes delineate the cluster that entered the statistical analysis and underlies the time–voltage plots to
either side.
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2.6.2. Experiment 2
All components of interest were quantiﬁed in the same manner
as for Experiment 1. A crucial design difference between the two
experiments was that Experiment 2 included four block types
rather than two: It included two block types with equivalent
feedback reliability (75%) but differing instructions, and two blocks
differing in objective feedback reliability (87.5% vs. 62.5%). Our
core analyses contrasted the ﬁrst two block types, where feedbackcontingencies were objectively identical but subjective expecta-
tions differed. These analyses of the FRN, P3, and N1 and P1 used
repeated-measures ANOVAs with the factors INSTRUCTION (reli-
able/unreliable) and VALENCE (positive/negative), and included all
correct trials preceding a rule reversal. For comparison with the
pure-instruction effects we observed, and with prior studies of the
FRN that have manipulated objective feedback reliability, we also
report FRN analyses that contrast blocks differing in objective
feedback reliability (87.5% vs. 62.5% reliability). For this analysis we
entered FRN amplitude measures into a repeated-measures
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LENCE (positive/negative).3. Results
3.1. Experiment 1
3.1.1. Experiment 1 – behavioural analysis
Experiment 1 investigated the effect of instructions about the
volatility of the environment on feedback processing. To compare
the neural correlates of feedback processing, it was important ﬁrst
to show that volatility instructions did not disrupt initial learning
of the mapping. All statistical analyses, if not stated otherwise, are
two-tailed, paired-sample t-tests, with an alpha-level of 0.05.
3.1.1.1. Experiment 1 – Initial learning. To test for potential effects of
instructions on learning of stimulus-response mappings, we
compared accuracy during the ﬁrst halves of all blocks (which
differ only in terms of instructions). As expected, there were no
reliable differences between the instruction types on performance
accuracy (to1): Mean accuracy was 80% for stability instruction
blocks (Standard-error of the mean (SEM)¼1%) as compared with
79% (SEM¼1%) in volatility-instructed blocks. As a related mea-
sure, we assessed whether instructions changed how efﬁciently
participants integrated feedback to acquire the initial mapping.
We therefore measured how many trials it took participants to
repeat the correct mapping, measured from the ﬁrst trial of each
block. Again, we found no signiﬁcant differences between in-
struction conditions, with 2.77 (SEM¼0.13) vs. 2.72 (SEM¼0.09)
trials, respectively (to1). Participants received negative feedback
on average on 37% (SEM¼1%) of trials during the ﬁrst half of vo-
latility instructed blocks and on 34% (SEM¼6%) of trials in the ﬁrst
half of stability instructed blocks. The difference was not sig-
niﬁcant (to1). These ﬁndings are relevant in interpreting analyses
of the FRN, which is usually described as a correlate of frequency-
based unexpectedness. Informativeness can only be separated
from low-level frequency effects if participants experience the
same amount of surprising negative feedback under both in-
struction conditions during the part of the blocks that enter the
FRN analysis. The initially equivalent performance shows that this
was the case.
3.1.1.2. Experiment 1 – the effect of instructions on adaptation. Clear
effects of instructions became apparent when we compared be-
haviour in the second halves of the blocks. Following a rule re-
versal, participants reached higher accuracy levels under volatility
than stability instructions (68%, SEM¼1%, vs. 64%, SEM¼1%; t
(27)¼2.5, po0.01). This performance difference was brought
about by faster adaptation to expected than non-expected rule
reversals, revealed by signiﬁcantly fewer trials-to-repetition after
rule reversal under volatility instruction than stability instructions
(4.7, SEM¼0.25, vs. 5.69, SEM¼0.27, respectively; t(27)¼3.61,
po0.01). More evidence for the role of instructions, even in the
absence of real changes in the environment, came from a com-
parison of performance in terms of percentage correct responses
for the second halves of the blocks where no reversal occurred.
Participants performed worse when they expected rule reversals
than when they did not (t(27)¼3.68, po0.01).
These differences in adaptation rate across instruction condi-
tions were apparent in the earliest blocks of the experiment, and
did not reliably increase in amplitude across blocks. The average
difference in trials-to-repetition between the ﬁrst rule reversal
under volatility instructions and the ﬁrst reversal under stability
instructions was 2.32 trials; this difference is statistically sig-
niﬁcant in a paired-samples t-test t(27)¼3.07, p¼0.0024. Theeffect size is re-assuring given that this analysis relies on single
block of data per subject and condition: Cohen's d¼0.78. The
difference between instructions for the last block with a rule re-
versal in each respective instruction condition was 1.39, a differ-
ence that was also statistically signiﬁcant in a paired-samples t-
test t(27)¼1.82, p¼0.039; Cohen's d¼0.49. There is no statistically
signiﬁcant effect of block when we compare the difference in
trials-to-repetition by instruction conditions in the ﬁrst and last
block of each respective condition (t(27)¼0.96, p¼0.34; Cohen's
d¼0.25). Taken together, these results suggests that observed
differences across conditions reﬂect participants’ ability to adjust
their learning ﬂexibly and rapidly according to the instruction
provided, rather than reﬂecting long-term learning (i.e., based on
the experience of prior blocks with differing instructions).
To test whether the comparative advantage in adapting to a
new rule under volatility instructions was caused by more ex-
ploratory behaviour following surprising feedback under volatility
than stability instructions (in the absence of actual rule reversals),
we compared across instruction conditions the proportion of trials
in which participants reversed the present mapping following a
surprising negative outcome. As expected, we found a signiﬁcant
effect of instruction on the probability of switching to the alternate
mapping following negative feedback in the ﬁrst half of blocks (t
(27)¼2.08, po0.05), with a larger propensity to switch in volati-
lity instruction blocks than stability instruction blocks (21% vs.
19%). The same comparison did not yield signiﬁcant differences in
the second half of blocks following actual rule reversals (to1),
presumably because participants understood that rules would
only reverse once per block.
In sum, these analyses showed that participants used instruc-
tions to improve their behaviour and, crucially, that the rate of
negative feedback between different instructions does not in-
crease low-level unexpectedness of negative feedback under vo-
latility instructions.
3.1.1.3. Experiment 1 – no differences in model-free negative RPEs.
The preceding analyses demonstrate that, at an aggregate level,
negative feedback was less surprising following volatility instruc-
tions than stability instructions (numerically so in the ﬁrst halves
of blocks, and reliably so considering both block halves). As an
additional measure to further rule out the possibility that differ-
ences in FRN amplitude between instruction conditions in our
paradigms may be conﬂated with differences in the low-level
unexpectedness of negative feedback at a trial-by-trial level, we
quantiﬁed instruction-blind unexpectedness by implementing a
standard model-free RL learning algorithm. We applied this algo-
rithm to calculate trial-by-trial reward prediction errors (RPEs) in
all blocks (learning rate¼0.5) according to the actual sequence of
stimuli, responses and outcomes experienced by each participant.
As with our EEG analyses, we focused on RPEs in ﬁrst half of each
block, where blocks differed solely in terms of instructions. Com-
paring the average RPE size (for signed, negative RPEs, which
correspond to unexpected negative events) across instruction
types, we found no signiﬁcant difference (to1). As intended, this
shows that an instruction-blind reinforcement-learning algorithm
that treats unexpected feedback identically under different in-
struction conditions cannot explain the predicted differences in
FRN amplitude.
3.1.1.4. Experiment 1 – Hidden Markov Model shows advantage of
instruction sensitivity. To test formally whether an artiﬁcial learner
that is sensitive to instructions would capture behaviour in the
task, we compared two Bayesian Hidden State Markov Models
(HMM; Ghahramani, 2001; Hampton et al., 2006). This family of
models has been shown to outperform reinforcement learning
models in explaining reversal learning in previous work (Hampton
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struction of our basis model. The models that we tested against
each other differed with regard to whether they were instruction
blind (basis model), or instruction sensitive (instruction model).
Thus, rather than compare RL and HMM algorithms as presented
by Hampton et al., (2006), we aimed to establish an advantage of
an instruction-sensitive compared to an instruction-blind learner,
within a class of models already known to be successful in re-
versal-learning. Decisions to reverse or persist with a mapping
were based on a trial-by-trial estimate of uncertainty in the en-
vironment (formalised as entropy, Shannon, 1948; please refer to
the Supplemental material for a full description of the models).
As expected, model comparison using Bayesian information
criterion (BIC) showed a positive (signiﬁcant) advantage (Kass and
Raftery, 1995) of the instruction-sensitive model (model 2) over
the instruction-blind model. Further, the results of the instruction-
sensitive parameter ﬁtting (see supplement) suggested that par-
ticipants were more averse to uncertainty under volatility than
under stability instructions. In formal terms, the entropy avoid-
ance parameter, α, was signiﬁcantly larger across the group under
volatility than under stability instructions (Mean αv¼0.7
SEM¼0.22; Mean αs¼0.52, SEM¼0.72 t(27)¼3.22, p¼0.003). Both
models performed satisfactorily at 479% correctly predicted trials
in all conditions (Fig. 3b). The presented models give a reasonable,
albeit imperfect ﬁt to the behavioural data. Which exact model
will ﬁt human behaviour best is a matter of ongoing research, but
the comparison of these reasonably successful models suggests
that artiﬁcial learners which compare experience with expecta-
tions about the environment, are better at explaining human be-
haviour than agents blind to this higher-order information.
3.1.2. Experiment 1 – EEG analysis
3.1.2.1. FRN modulation by volatility instructions. The primary EEG
analysis of Experiment 1 tested whether instructed volatility—which
should increase informativeness of feedback events—would mod-
ulate FRN amplitude. We hypothesised that the neural response to-
wards unexpectedness is modulated by the perceived informative-
ness of the event, and therefore that we would observe larger FRN
amplitude under volatility compared to stability instructions. In line
with this hypothesis, we found a main effect of INSTRUCTION (F
(1,27)¼5.36, p¼0.030) in the predicted direction, with a larger FRN
for feedback under volatility compared to stability instructions in the
22 repeated-measures ANOVA (Fig. 4). Further, we established a
main effect of VALENCE (F(1,27)¼34.74, po0.001) with the typical
pattern of a larger negative extent of the waveform for negative than
positive feedback. There was no statistically signiﬁcant interaction
between the effects (F(1,27)¼2.28, p¼0.142). Investigating the main
effect of instruction further in planned comparisons, we found that
there was a signiﬁcant difference in FRN amplitude following nega-
tive feedback under volatility instructions as compared to stability
instructions: t(27)¼2.55, p¼0.016. However, the paired t-test for
effects of instruction in positive feedback events failed to show a
signiﬁcant difference: to1.
To assess whether differences in response-feedback interval
affected the FRN, we ran an additional 222 repeated-mea-
sures ANOVA, including the between-group factor EXPERIMENT
VERSION (1a/1b). We found no effect of this between-group
variable (Fo1) and no interaction of the between group variable
with either of the two main effects (interaction with INSTRUC-
TION: Fo1; interaction with VALENCE: F(1,27)¼1.71, p¼0.2). Fi-
nally, there was also no reliable three-way interaction between
EXPERIMENT VERSION, INSTRUCTION, and VALENCE (F(1,27)¼1.07,
p¼0.3).
3.1.2.2. SPN modulation by volatility instructions. We expected in-
structions to change not only feedback processing, but alsoanticipation of feedback as it is reﬂected in the SPN. In a repeated-
measures ANOVA with the factors INSTRUCTION, TIME, and LA-
TERALITY, we established the predicted effect of INSTRUCTION
(F(1,13)¼7.01, p¼0.02). The SPN reached greater (i.e., more nega-
tive) amplitude under volatility instructions than under stability
instructions, a sign of increased preparation for feedback proces-
sing in this condition. We further established a signiﬁcant effect of
LATERALITY (F(2,26)¼5.88, p¼0.008), reﬂecting the typical right-
hemisphere dominance of the SPN. The effect of TIME reached
only marginal signiﬁcance (F(2,26)¼2.69, p¼0.087), but there was a
signiﬁcant interaction between the TIME and LATERALITY
(F(4,52)¼3.1, p¼0.023), because the difference between the right
and left hemisphere in the amplitude of the negative deﬂection of
the waveform increased over time.
3.1.2.3. P3 modulation reﬂecting behavioural adaptation. A ﬁrst
analysis of the P3 assessed whether this component would show
similar modulation by informativeness as the FRN and SPN. The
results indicated not: For the P3 we found no reliable effect of
INSTRUCTION (F(1,26)¼2.8, p¼0.102), but a signiﬁcant effect of
VALENCE (F(1,26)¼7.8, po0.01) with greater P3 amplitude fol-
lowing negative than positive feedback, and no interaction of IN-
STRUCTION and VALENCE (Fo1). Our second analysis of the P3
focused on its relationship with behaviour on trials following ne-
gative feedback (cf. Chase et al., 2011). In a 22 repeated mea-
sures ANOVAwith the factors NEXT TRIAL BEHAVIOUR (reversal or
repetition) and INSTRUCTION, we found a signiﬁcant effect of
NEXT TRIAL BEHAVIOUR (F(1,26)¼33.79, po0.001), with greater P3
amplitude following negative feedback that led to reversals of
behaviour (Fig. 5). However, in this analysis we found no main
effect of INSTRUCTION (Fo1) and no interaction between NEXT
TRIAL BEHAVIOUR and INSTRUCTION (F(1,26)¼1.95, p¼0.17). We
thus established that P3 amplitude was relatively insensitive to
instruction but was predictive of participants’ behaviour on the
next trial. The latter ﬁnding perhaps accounts for the VALENCE
effect in the ﬁrst analysis: P3 amplitude may be larger for trials
with negative than positive feedback because negative trials are
more often followed by a reversal in behaviour.
3.1.2.4. P1 and N1 modulation by volatility instructions. To test
whether the established FRN effect was modulated by an in-
struction effect on low-level attention to feedback stimuli, we
measured visual P1 and N1 potentials evoked by feedback events.
This analysis found no signiﬁcant effect of INSTRUCTION, or VA-
LENCE, and no interaction between the two on the P1 (all Fso1).
There was likewise no signiﬁcant main effect or interaction in the
corresponding repeated measures ANOVA for the N1 (all Fo1).
Similar null-effects were established in additional analyses mea-
suring the N1 as base-to-peak amplitude either in this posterior
cluster, or in a fronto-central cluster. In sum, the analyses of visual
potentials towards feedback events do not suggest that the effects
established in the FRN analyses are driven by an attention-or-
ienting effect that differed across instruction conditions.
3.1.3. Experiment 1 summary
Behavioural analysis of Experiment 1 showed that participants
integrated instructions and experienced feedback, adapting faster
to unannounced rule switches faster under volatility instructions.
EEG recordings showed that instructions clearly modulated pre-
paration for stimulus processing, as signiﬁed by increased SPN
amplitude under volatility instructions. Rapid evaluation of the
feedback, reﬂected in the FRN, showed an integration of experi-
enced feedback and instructions: FRN amplitude was increased
under volatility instructions, i.e., when feedback informativeness
was increased. P3 amplitude, by comparison, did not vary by in-
struction, but instead varied as a function of behaviour on the next
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conditions, intact learning of the new-mapping following rule
reversals in the stability-instructed blocks, and no difference in
reaction times between instruction conditions show that these
effects are not driven by a lack of task-engagement or attention to
the task under stability instruction.
3.2. Experiment 2
3.2.1. Experiment 2 – behavioural analysis
The second experiment investigated the effect on feedback
processing of instructions about feedback reliability. To create a
plausible context for the target instruction conditions, which had
identical feedback reliability, we also implemented two conditions
that differed with regard to objective feedback reliability. We
provide a brief summary of the main comparisons of conditions
with objective reliability differences (high reliability vs. low re-
liability) and then focus on the critical comparisons of blocks with
identical objective reliability but different instructions (instructed
reliability vs. instructed unreliability), corresponding to the ana-
lyses presented for Experiment 1. All statistical analyses, if not
stated otherwise, are two-tailed, paired-sample t-test, with an
alpha-level of 0.05.
3.2.1.1. Performance with different levels of objective feedback relia-
bility. Initial acquisition of the correct mapping showed effects of
objective feedback reliability, with signiﬁcantly higher perfor-
mance (percent correct) in blocks with reliable (89%, SEM¼1%)
than unreliable feedback (75%, SEM¼3%; t(14)¼5.83, po0.01),
and fewer initial trials-to-repetition of the correct rule, (2.21, vs.
4.71, trials, t(14)¼5.51, po0.01). Unreliable feedback also made it
harder to adapt behaviour to unannounced changes in task rules,
as evident from higher accuracy after rules had reversed in the
reliable (85%, SEM¼1%) than the unreliable feedback blocks (58%,
SEM¼3%; t(14)¼7.99, po0.01), and fewer trials-to-repetition in
reliable (3.62, SEM¼0.17) compared to unreliable blocks (6.7,
SEM¼0.58; t(14)¼5.34, po0.01). Lastly, the propensity to switch
to an alternative mapping following negative feedback was higher
under reliability (20%, SEM¼2%) than unreliability conditions (14%,
SEM¼3%), although the difference was only marginally signiﬁcant
(t(14)¼2, po0.1).
3.2.1.2. Experiment 2 – effect of reliability instructions on initial ac-
quisition. Comparing performance in blocks with objectively
identical feedback reliability but differing instructions, we found
no reliable difference in accuracy between reliability-instruction
blocks (86%, SEM¼1%) than unreliability-instructed blocks (80%,
SEM¼4%; t(14)¼1.28, p¼0.22). As hypothesised, and similar to the
results of Experiment 1, instructions had no reliable effect on the
number of trials to establish the initially correct mapping under
instructed reliability (2.7, SEM¼0.15) than instructed unreliability
(3.8, SEM¼0.69; t(14)¼1.44, p¼0.17) (Fig. 2). Finally, instruction
effects were evident as the propensity to switch to an alternative
mapping following negative feedback was signiﬁcantly higher (t
(14)¼2.14, po0.05) under reliability instructions (16%, SEM¼2%)
than unreliability instructions (12%, SEM¼2%).
3.2.1.3. Experiment 2 – effect of instructions on adaptation of beha-
viour. Participants showed less sensitivity to rule reversals in
unreliability-instructed blocks than reliability-instructed blocks.
Overall accuracy was numerically higher post-reversal in relia-
bility-instructed blocks than in unreliability-instructed blocks (74%
vs. 67%), although this difference did not reach signiﬁcance (t
(14)¼1.6, p¼0.26). Reduction in trials-to-repetition of the correct
rule reached marginal signiﬁcance (t(14)¼1.98, p¼0.066), with
fewer trials in reliability-instructed (4.9, SEM¼0.43) compared tounreliability-instructed (6.08, SEM¼0.6) blocks (Fig. 2).
Comparison of adaptation rate measured as trials-to-repetition
in the ﬁrst block and last block of each instruction condition led to
slightly less conclusive results than in Experiment 1. There was no
signiﬁcant effect of instruction comparing only the ﬁrst block of
each instruction type in which there was a rule reversal (t(14)¼
0.9, p¼0.19, Cohen's d¼0.26). The effect was signiﬁcant in the last
block, however (t(14)¼2.9, p¼0.058, Cohen's d¼0.88). As in Ex-
periment 1, there was no effect of block between the differences
found under different instructions (t(14)¼1.1, p¼0.31, Cohen's
d¼0.37). Again, we thus ﬁnd no conclusive evidence to suggest
that the modulation of behaviour by instructions was altered by
long-term experience with the instructions. We note that the
power of this statistical test may be limited, as it is based on ob-
servations from a single block per condition across 15 participants.
Finally, there were no effects of instruction on the likelihood of
participants to reverse their mapping following surprising nega-
tive feedback once they had established the new rule (to1); again
this effect can be explained by participants understanding that
rules would reverse only once during a block.
3.2.1.4. Experiment 2 – no differences in model-free negative RPEs.
The same instruction-blind, model-free RL algorithm that was
used for Experiment 1 was applied to the data from Experiment 2,
and yielded again no difference in average negative RPE amplitude
between instruction conditions in trials preceding rule reversals (t
(14)¼1.51, p¼0.151). Low-level unexpectedness is therefore un-
likely to account for any differences in amplitude of relevant EEG
components across instruction conditions, as established below.
3.2.2. Experiment 2 – EEG
The EEG analysis in Experiment 2 proceeded in three steps. We
ﬁrst established the effects of differences in objective reliability on
the FRN, comparing only the highly reliable and highly unreliable
conditions in a 22 repeated-measures ANOVA with the factors
VALENCE and CONDITION. After establishing the effects of real
differences in reliability, we then tested whether instructed re-
liability would lead to comparable effects on the FRN as instruc-
tions on volatility. Third, we again tested whether an effect of di-
rected attention could account for changes in FRN amplitude
(measuring N1 and P1) and assessed the pre-reversal effects on P3
amplitude, as in Experiment 1.
3.2.2.1. FRN modulation by objective feedback reliability. Testing for
the effects of objective reliability, we found that CONDITION had
no signiﬁcant effect on the size of the FRN (F(1,14)¼2.52, p¼0.13).
Feedback VALENCE had the expected signiﬁcant effect on the FRN
(F(1,14)¼195.39 po0.01), with greater amplitude following nega-
tive than positive feedback. Moreover, there was a signiﬁcant in-
teraction between the two factors (F(1,14)¼13.46, po0.01), in-
dicating that the difference in FRN amplitude between positive
and negative feedback was larger when feedback was highly re-
liable than when it was unreliable.
3.2.2.2. FRN modulation by instructed reliability. The crucial test for
the modulation of the FRN by instructions in Experiment 2, yiel-
ded no signiﬁcant main effect of INSTRUCTION (F(1,14)¼1.2,
p¼0.29), a signiﬁcant effect of VALENCE (F(1,14)¼82.98, po0.001)
and a signiﬁcant interaction between the two factors (F(1,14)¼9.09
po0.01). A paired t-test showed that the difference between in-
struction conditions was highly signiﬁcant for negative feedback (t
(14)¼2.38, p¼0.03; two-tailed), with reliability instructions
leading to larger FRN amplitude than unreliability instructions, as
predicted. Interestingly, the paired t-test for positive feedback
showed that the interaction was also inﬂuenced by the positive
feedback events, which yielded a signiﬁcant difference in the
Fig. 6. Modulation of the FRN by Reliability Instruction. Time–voltage plots showing the FRN component following positive (dashed lines) and negative (solid lines)
unexpected feedback under reliability (left panel) and unreliability (right panel) instructions in the intermediate conditions, which are matched for actual feedback relia-
bility. The bar graphs (middle panel) plot the average over individual amplitudes, showing that there is no signiﬁcant main effect of instruction on amplitude (1), instead we
ﬁnd the signiﬁcant interaction between valence and instruction. This interaction is driven by signiﬁcant difference between FRN amplitude following unexpected negative
events in the comparison of reliability-instructed and unreliability-instructed blocks (2), as well as a signiﬁcant (positive) difference between FRN amplitude following
positive feedback under unreliability instruction compared with unexpected negative feedback under reliability instruction. Voltage topographies show the difference
between positive and (unexpected) negative feedback under the respective instruction conditions in the time interval between 200 ms and 310 ms post stimulus onset. Dark
electrodes delineate clusters that entered the respective statistical analysis and correspond to the electrodes averaged in time–voltage plots. All error bars display standard-
error of the mean.
A.-M. Schiffer et al. / NeuroImage 146 (2017) 626–641638opposite direction. That is, positive feedback led to a larger FRN
under unreliability instructions than under reliability instructions
(t(14)¼3.21, p¼ .006) (Fig. 6).
3.2.2.3. P3 modulation reﬂecting behavioural adaptation. As in Ex-
periment 1, overall P3 amplitude following negative and positive
feedback was not reliably inﬂuenced by instruction: A repeated
measures ANOVA with the factors INSTRUCTION and VALENCE
yielded no signiﬁcant effect of INSTRUCTION (F(1,14)¼1.96, p¼0.18)
and contrary to Experiment 1, no effect of VALENCE (Fo1), and
likewise no interaction (Fo1). As in Experiment 1, we additionally
investigated the relationship between P3 amplitude and beha-
vioural adaptation following negative feedback. Here we once
again replicated the effect of NEXT TRIAL BEHAVIOUR on P3 am-
plitude (F(1,14)¼8.75, p¼0.01), with larger P3 amplitude preceding
switches than repetitions of the mapping applied. There was no
reliable main effect of INSTRUCTION (Fo1), but a signiﬁcant in-
teraction between NEXT TRIAL BEHAVIOUR and INSTRUCTION
(F(1,14)¼11.09, po0.01). This interaction indicated that the re-
versal-related increase in P3 amplitude was greater under relia-
bility-instruction than unreliability-instruction (Fig. 5).
3.2.2.4. P1 and N1 modulation by instructions. Analysis of the P1
and N1 components provided some evidence of differences in low-
level attention to feedback as a function of instruction condition.
For the P1, we found no signiﬁcant effect of INSTRUCTION (Fo1), a
signiﬁcant effect of VALENCE (F(1,14)¼8.074, p¼0.013), with posi-
tive feedback leading to a larger P1 than negative feedback, and a
trend-level interaction (F(1,14)¼4.05, p¼0.063). The interaction
was driven by a larger P1 amplitude after positive than negative
feedback especially in blocks with reliability instruction comparedto blocks with unreliability instruction. For the N1 component, we
observed a reliable main effect of VALENCE (F(1,14)¼7.99, p¼0.013),
a main effect of INSTRUCTION (F(1,14)¼7.4, p¼0.016) and a sig-
niﬁcant interaction (F(1,14)¼47.14, po0.001). The interaction was
driven by a larger N1 following negative feedback than positive
feedback, speciﬁcally under instructed reliability. Thus, overall in
this experiment, it seems that more attention was directed to-
wards feedback events that were expected to be reliable (and
which subsequently elicited an enhanced FRN).
3.2.3. Experiment 2 summary
Behavioural analysis of Experiment 2 replicated and extended
the major ﬁndings of Experiment 1. Instructions that increased the
informativeness of the feedback (here, reliability instructions) led
to faster adaptation following rule reversals. Further, Experiment
2 replicated the key ﬁnding that feedback processing can be
modulated by higher-order representations, again showing an
increase in FRN amplitude for instructions emphasizing informa-
tiveness of the feedback. In contrast to the results of Experiment 1,
this FRN modulation was accompanied by reliable changes in early
visual potentials evoked by feedback presentation, suggesting
differences in the level of attention paid to feedback across in-
struction conditions. However, behavioural markers (e.g., how
quickly the initial mapping is acquired in both conditions) suggest
that overall task engagement did not differ as a function of in-
structed reliability. Finally, this experiment replicated the ﬁnding
that P3 amplitude was predictive of changes in behaviour on the
next trial but, in contrast to Experiment 1, that this effect was
modulated by instruction (as a function of the informative value of
the feedback).
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The present experiments demonstrate consistent inﬂuence of
high-level belief, manipulated via explicit instruction, on beha-
vioural and neural markers of adaptive learning. Speciﬁcally, we
assessed the impact of manipulating perceived informative value
of trial-by-trial feedback in a novel reversal-learning task, by
providing instructions about the volatility of the environment and
the reliability of the feedback. We predicted that increased in-
formativeness would change how readily participants adapt be-
haviour following unexpected feedback, and would modulate
processing in a neural system so far predominantly associated
with experience-driven reward prediction errors. Both experi-
ments conﬁrmed these predictions, showing that learning is faster
and FRN amplitude increases when negative feedback is perceived
to be more informative of changes in the environment. These in-
struction effects were observed in the very ﬁrst blocks of the ex-
periment, demonstrating that they did not depend on global ex-
pectancies built up through participants’ experience with task
contingencies, but rather reﬂected rapid and ﬂexible assimilation
of instructed information into the learning process. These changes
in learning as a function of perceived informativeness of feedback
were reﬂected in increased amplitude of the FRN component. At
the same time, we observed increased preparation for feedback
processing as its informational value increased, as reﬂected in
enhanced pre-feedback EEG activity. Together, these ﬁndings are
indicative of a ﬂexible learning system that integrates instruction
and experience to guide adaptive behaviour.
A core component of adaptive behaviour is determining whe-
ther unexpected outcomes are a consequence of lasting changes in
our environment, or rather reﬂect chance occurrence. Whereas
environmental changes require adaptation, perseverance is crucial
in producing effective goal-directed behaviour when faced with
random aberrations. High-level knowledge about the informa-
tiveness of feedback in a given environment can assist in accu-
rately interpreting that feedback. A key feature of our experi-
mental designs was therefore de-confounding experience-based
expectancies and informative value. In Experiment 1, instruction
that rules are likely to reverse (high volatility) made negative
feedback more informative compared to negative feedback under
stability instructions; however, if anything negative feedback was
also less surprising under volatility instructions compared to sta-
bility instructions. In Experiment 2, instructions indicating in-
creased feedback reliability render negative feedback more sur-
prising and more informative than it appears under unreliability
instructions. Both experiments showed that the FRN increased
with the informative value of negative feedback, even in the ab-
sence of accompanying differences in the expectedness negative
feedback (as reﬂected in overall probability, and in negative re-
ward prediction error derived from a simple model-free re-
inforcement learning algorithm).
Our ﬁndings thus represent a departure from existing char-
acterisations of the FRN-indexed learning system as reﬂecting a
rapid evaluation of experience, with regard to the valence of
feedback (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004; Yeung and Sanfey, 2004) or
reward prediction error (Holroyd and Coles, 2002; Walsh and
Anderson, 2012; Hauser, 2014 Sambrook and Goslin, 2014). In-
stead, they suggest that the neural system generating prediction
errors is cognitively penetrable and integrates higher-order in-
formation in prediction error processing. This conclusion suggests
a direct and facilitatory effect of instruction on reinforcement
learning, which points to a nuanced picture of the relationship
between instruction-based and experience-based learning (cf.
O’Reilly, 2013).
On the one hand, previous results seem to suggest in-
dependence of model-based processing, which refers toknowledge about the contingencies between events, and model-
free processing of experienced feedback. This work proposed a
two-stage model of adaptive learning and goal-directed action
(Daw et al., 2005; Walsh and Anderson, 2011). Within this fra-
mework, responses that are implemented based on instructions
(i.e., based on a model of events) override, rather than directly
modulate, the computations of model-free reinforcement learning.
This account has been supported by evidence that information
about the value of choosing a particular stimulus inﬂuences choice
behaviour but does not modulate FRN amplitude (Walsh and An-
derson, 2011). On the other hand, some recent work suggests an
antagonistic relationship between model-free and model-based
learning, with neural signatures of model-free prediction errors
diminished when participants made choices driven by model-
based evaluation of stimulus outcomes (Doll et al., 2015). Thus,
across different studies, there is evidence that instruction and
experience work in concert (as in the present experiments), that
they can operate largely independently (Walsh and Anderson,
2011), or that they are mutually inhibitory (Doll et al., 2015).
We interpret these ﬁndings and theories as consistent rather
than contradictory, speciﬁcally by pointing to the ﬂexibility of the
learning process according to current task demands: When in-
structions are valid and render feedback irrelevant to choice, op-
timal behaviour relies on implementing the instruction and es-
sentially ignoring the feedback, so integration of experience and
instruction and not required (Walsh and Anderson, 2011). Con-
versely, when model-based evaluation and model-free learning
are equally suited to solve a task, it seems that the model-based
system will inform the model-free learner to the degree to which
the higher-order system is involved in selecting actions (Doll et al.
2015). This ﬁnding of possible communication between systems is
consistent with our results. However, our paradigm is unique in
that optimal behaviour relies on integration of information from
two different sources—participants use a model of the world
(based on instructions) to inform their interpretation of experi-
enced low-level contingencies (based on feedback), rather than
trading-off the utility of information from high-level representa-
tions and low-level contingencies. This conclusion considerably
extends existing knowledge in showing that higher-order re-
presentations can amplify, rather than diminish prediction error
processing.
An interesting tangent in this regard is work that characterises
prediction errors as markers of the salience of external events,
rather than as indices of the valence of feedback (Redgrave and
Gurney, 2006). In the context of this idea, our ﬁndings would
imply that informativeness is a high-level source of salience,
which constitutes an unsigned, valence-unrelated quality mod-
ulating the neural response to feedback above and beyond the
effects of low-level unexpectedness (unsigned surprise).
The neural mechanisms underlying integration of instruction-
modulated and experience-driven learning is likely to involve a
functional interplay between the prefrontal cortex and the basal
ganglia. The basal ganglia are classically associated with model-
free prediction errors; while the FRN is understood to be gener-
ated in the anterior cingulate cortex (Hauser et al., 2014), it is
assumed to relate to the output of basal ganglia computations (Foti
et al., 2011; Hauser et al., 2014; Holroyd and Coles, 2002). We thus
add to recent work, as our results suggest that basal ganglia pro-
cessing is informed by high-level beliefs from instruction; pre-
vious work has suggested that these high-level representation
likely depend on ﬂexible representations in prefrontal cortex (Doll,
2011; Stocco et al., 2010, 2012; Chatham et al., 2014; Mestres-
Misse et al., 2016). If this is the case, one mechanism by which
modulation could be achieved is through PFC inﬂuence on striatal
processing as observed by Li et al. (2011).
Further work that supports the link between basal-ganglia
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combination of computational modelling and genotyping: Parti-
cipants of a genotype that diminishes the striatal response to
unexpected negative events ﬁnd it harder to re-learn the actual
worth of a stimulus after receiving false information (Doll et al.,
2011). Further, patients with schizophrenia, a neurological condi-
tion associated with a change in dopaminergic innervation of the
prefrontal cortex (Doll et al., 2014), are less susceptible to (false)
instructed beliefs about the value of a stimulus than healthy
controls. Together, these results suggest interplay of basal ganglia
and prefrontal computations where, on the one hand, prefrontal
modulation provides an additional input to basal ganglia compu-
tations. On the other hand, tracking of prediction errors in the
basal ganglia can reverse the inﬂuence of false higher-order in-
formation (Doll et al., 2011). Our results go further in providing
evidence that prediction error signals, which constitute the output
of the basal ganglia, are informed by prefrontal input when in-
tegration of experience and higher-order knowledge is essential
for optimal behaviour in the task. In this context, however, we
note that the relationship between basal ganglia prediction errors
and the FRN remains a topic of debate, and information transfer
between these network components may be bi-directional (Frank
et al., 2005, Cavanagh and Frank, 2014). Whether integration of
higher-order and low-level information is achieved at the stage of
the basal ganglia computation, or within the PFC, is a key question
for future work.
Regardless, the mechanistic implication of this model is that
the integrated learning system is proactive in selecting relevant
information to guide learning. We ﬁnd evidence of this active
preparation for processing learning-relevant feedback in modula-
tions of the SPN component (Kotani et al., 2013), which we have
shown to be inﬂuenced by current beliefs regarding the in-
formative value of feedback. This effect was observed in the ab-
sence of consistent modulation of early visual potentials, sug-
gesting that preparation does not simply entail low-level atten-
tional adjustments. Rather, we ﬁnd a modulation preceding the
sampling process by interpretation of the anticipated relevance of
feedback for adaptive behaviour.
The suggestion that integration of higher-order beliefs mod-
ulates behaviour is consistent with ﬁndings from our Hidden
Markov Model (HMM) comparison. Here, we modelled the impact
of volatility instructions as increasing the learner's aversion to-
wards uncertainty caused by unexpected feedback. An implication
of this approach is that instructions modulate how experience is
interpreted to form action policies, rather than modulating state
estimations (e.g., of the likelihood of negative vs. positive feed-
back). Indeed, we found that the FRN amplitude did not predict
behaviour on the next trial, suggesting that although this signal
integrates higher-order beliefs and experience, the behavioural
effect of instructions may be driven by a modulation of a para-
meter at a later stage in the action selection hierarchy. However, it
remains for future work to test formally whether artiﬁcial learners
that focus on the integration-stage could predict behaviour better
than learners in which instruction alters parameters of action se-
lection, and whether neural markers of the selection stage vary
according to beliefs.
Both of the present experiments replicated the ﬁnding that P3
amplitude following negative feedback increases when partici-
pants’ choose to change strategy on the following trial (Chase
et al., 2011). As previously mentioned, no close link to trial-by-trial
behaviour was apparent in the FRN. We interpret this ﬁnding
within the framework of the P3 as a marker of decision-making
which holds that P3 amplitude reﬂects the accumulation of evi-
dence in favour of one decision (e.g., stay or switch) over another
(O'Connell et al., 2012). The nature of the study does not allow us
to discriminate whether the P3 amplitude reﬂects behaviouraladaptation as a global process, or is limited to rule-switching.
Contrary to the FRN, this P3 effect did not consistently vary
according to participants’ beliefs about the informativeness of the
current feedback: We found modulation of P3 amplitude only with
instructions about feedback reliability, and not environment vo-
latility. A possible explanation for this difference is that if the P3 in
fact tracks evidence for the correctness of a foregoing decision, this
tracking may be inﬂuenced by information about the evidence
itself (i.e., the feedback reliability), but not to the same degree by
information about the environment in which this evidence occurs
(i.e., information in volatility of the environment).Conclusion
We used instructions about the environment as a canonical form of
high-level inﬂuence in a task requiring ﬂexible adaptation of beha-
viour. Our experiments show that instructions about higher-level
features of the environment can change neural processing of action
outcomes. In light of the present ﬁndings, and against the backdrop of
previous work, we argue that experience of outcomes and instruction
can mutually inform each other to promote ﬂexible, adaptive beha-
viour. Clearly, instructions are just one, arguably uniquely human,
source of higher-order representation. Past experience can likewise
aggregate to higher-order representations, shaping expectations that
can in turn modulate how the surprise associated with immediate
feedback is interpreted.
Collectively, these computations solve the task of determining
the signiﬁcance of unexpected events. This ﬂexibility allows hu-
man learners to successfully navigate in our complex, volatile
environments, and to make informed decisions about whether to
persevere or explore new options when we are surprised by the
consequences of our actions. Future work will need to address the
neural basis of this ﬂexible learning, testing whether informa-
tiveness-modulated surprise signals are generated within the
prefrontal-basal ganglia network as we propose above, and whe-
ther neural correlates of action selection reﬂect parameters that
predict behaviour. Combining computational models of behaviour
with trial-by-trial measures of neural variability, such as afforded
by fMRI and MEG, appears the most promising approach to un-
cover the foundations underlying this type of ﬂexible behaviour.Conﬂict of interest
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